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Initial phish

Russia-nexus actor targets Ukraine

StrikeReady Labs Research July 24, 2024 by Alex Lanstein

Recently an email was forwarded to Virustotal, appearing to show a ukr.net sender spoofing “Headquarters Police Department” (Головне управління поліції), targeting a government organization related to the Ukrainian economy.

Detection takeaways:

  • The zip attachment was only 341 bytes, and the underlying attachment was even smaller at 134 bytes
  • These very small sizes may bypass filters analysts or tools use to weed out junk files

Initial phish

Figure 1: email spoofing a Ukrainian police org

Attachmentsha256translated
терміново_23_07_2024.zipc16926a74f8d30b4086057241edc46e88bb0cf675ff5b5ced93ea654ea2b4e26(urgently _23_07_2024.zip)
терміново_info_23_07_2024.html9e49db0eb920e130c0393a87c96434b9f0257025584cf546f623c1cb0b074333(urgently_info_23_07_2024.html)

Figure 2: attachments to email

The initial HTML was very small, 134 bytes, and was simply a redirect to an external site.

Initial phish

Figure 3: simple redirect, perhaps to prevent anti-spam detection

The page content is the below, and one can notice that it’s a phishing page for ukr.net, a Ukrainian webmail service. This service is a frequent target for Russia-nexus threat actors.

Initial phish

Figure 4: UKR credential phishing

The doc.html page contains a numerous amount of sig-able artifacts to find similar phishing pages. Signatures need not be written on malicious content to be effective. In the below example, the <head lang="uk"> is unusual. lang= is typically inside a <html> tag instead of <head>, but when you can combine this with other indicators, two weak signals can become a strong signature.

Initial phish

Figure 5: snippet of doc.html

landing pagessha256
doc.htmlefd54e566767de3e35597dae60d317b388460ffc2b3231bd4897b254863835cc
index.html5d93ee6f0f4e88d06f384a84ec4401100ec6b1d01062af23acebd3f314379be0
file1.html5b694114129846328da15d79e2bc6a4b19f887e86ae8f0abc6d9572a8b88e431

Figure 6: associated landing pages

Examining the landing pages, we can notice the credentials will be POST’d to a PHP script and then redirected.

Initial phish

Figure 7: Analysts raise an eyebrow at “dl8”

After the credentials are sent, the PHP script redirects us to a decoy that might be interesting to a Ukrainian target. When analysts see “dl8.php”, they typically wonder what may live at “dl1.php”, “dl2.php”, etc.

Initial phish

Figure 8: decoy content after credentials are entered

After looping through dl[0-9].php, we can harvest a number of other interesting decoy files as well as IOCs.

dl.php82.221.139[.]200/login/php/1308_8711629.html
dl2.php82.221.139[.]200/login/php/zrazok.pdf
dl3.php82.221.139[.]200/login/php/organizations_kharkiv_2021_12_03-1.xlsx
dl4.php82.221.139[.]200/login/php/47.pdf
dl5.php82.221.139[.]200/login/php/tsu-sbu-vid-13042023-131-site.doc
dl6.phpukainua[.]com/login/php/d534990-20240427.pdf
dl7.phpukainua[.]com/login/php/Dod_Zvit_pro_kons_III_kvartal_2021_.pdf
dl8.phpuasystdoc[.]com/login/php/Dod_Zvit_pro_kons_III_kvartal_2021_.pdf

Figure 9: credential gathering and decoy redirecting scripts

A sampling of the decoy content is show below.

zrazok.pdf47.pdfd534990-20240427.pdf
img-fluidimg-fluidimg-fluid

Figure 10: three of the decoy files from the table above, showing Ukrainian themes

A quick pivot to passivedns through our community account at silentpush shows many likely related domains, shared in our github.

Initial phish

Figure 11: passive dns for 82.221.139[.]200

Lastly, pivots on the layout of the phishing page, combined with negating legitimate infrastructure, will lead to similar phishing campaign.

PhishIOCs
Figure 12: UKR.NET.pdf

Figure 12: UKR.NET.pdf

changepassword-ukr[.]net/desktop/security/login/

38963b61113b7b88e3fce30539e63b4745f8d91f8e2577b6597a09648b105733
img-fluidaccounts.ukr-reset[.]email/login/

2f1f4b077b6fc40d8f0c995e80657448478a08acdf0e33ee2b73602bda62270c
img-fluid

Figure 13: Попередження.pdf

accounts.ukr-mails[.]net/login

853f21ba9a8a362a9bafc98204eb70b8c23ba845359e694984711ec1485d0c2f
img-fluidaccounts.kv-ukr[.]net/login/

e159886a173f021b345ad152ad84beed3ac39b6a7455805c255f38d7b4c9434c
VendorThreat Actor name
Google Cloud Security (neé Mandiant)UNC3707
You?Get in touch for blog pre-releases!

Figure 14: Other validated vendor names for this actor

Our github provides a download to the raw samples mentioned in the blog, as well as the indicators.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the reviewers, as well as peer vendors, for their comments and corrections. Please get in touch at research@strikeready.com if you have corrections, or would like to collaborate on research.

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Alex Lanstein

Chief Evangelist

Alex Lanstein is the Chief Evangelist at StrikeReady, running threat research and driving DFIR platform capabilities. Previously, Alex spent 15 years at FireEye, closing the loop between threat actor observations and product development.

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