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Initial phish

Pivoting through a Sea of indicators to spot Turtles

StrikeReady Labs Research December 27, 2023 by Alex Lanstein

Sea Turtle is a threat group that tends to swim under the radar, but recently the Ministry of Justice in Greece, PWC, and others before them, published reports containing infrastructure currently in use. It was once believed that when an IP or domain was outed publicly, that an actor, especially a well-resourced one, would burn it down. In this blog we’ll pull on threads to show that isn’t always the case.

Sea Turtle, like most threat groups, leverages traditional malware for access, but also has used complex DNS hijacking techniques that were covered well in the above blogs. Many of the spoofed domains below would be of interest to those focused on domestic Turkish issues.

This analysis will focus on four major concepts in infrastructure pivoting.

  • Passive or Active DNS pivoting
    • There is no perfect answer to the question “what domains are sitting on an IP?”. Data vendors try to answer this question for analysts in a variety of ways, the most common being passive or active DNS, where the vendor collects responses for DNS requests, either by sniffing resolver traffic, by reading resolver logs, or by actively doing forward record lookups of domains
  • SSL certificate tracking
    • Observing SSL certificates can often broaden a set of suspect infra, either by direct movement (seeing a cert from server A move to server B), or by tracking specific attributes of certs over time.
    • Additionally, it would not be uncommon to see domains in certs for which you don’t have a passive/active DNS record. An actor may prep their server and add a cert before making their campaign live.
  • Matching server response content to find similar infra
    • For instance, a particular HTTP response header, the fuzzy hash of body content, or the way a server responds when you throw particular data at it. Many folks scan the internet with a 5 byte ASCII string “Gh0st”, in order to see if the server they’re talking to will respond like a Gh0st RAT server.
  • Discovering malware samples that are related to your original set, by looking for domain/ip overlaps, or by looking for static content with YARA that you don’t expect to be in many unrelated samples

When tracking a threat actor, an analyst develops a confidence for whether a particular indicator belongs in her dataset or not. This confidence is based on examining artifacts over time, and with an eye towards which technical links are of what quality. Servers often change ownership, ‘A’ records can be forged when a c2 isn’t operational, and supposed “uniqueness” may not be so unique upon further review. Sea Turtle leverages a multitude of these techniques which aggravate an investigation

Perhaps in an effort to provide a veil of legitimacy, or to improve a general “risk score” of their domain, this actor frequently points (or parks) their domain at large cloud providers, such as amazon/akamai/google. However, when the domain is used operationally, they typically leverage dedicated providers such as BLNWX, MVPS, Choopa, or the like.

Throughout their campaigns, they acquire domains (or leverage ddns) that look legitimate, such as systemctl.network, *.sslname.com, netssh.net, and serverssl.net. “serverssl” and “netssh” have nothing in common from a top level infrastructure perspective, but if you notice similar looking domains on a low density server, and see them move to IPs with the same provider, you can start to piece together lower quality sources of data.

In the first pivot, we can do simple network or yara based pivot to find samples that are similar to the PWC or Greek DOJ report. The high-fidelity IoCs are collated in a github link at the end of the post, but we provide our reasoning in each table.

hashextracted indicator for pivotfilename from VT
01b8a91f3d4446f2bdd22c85b225dfd2f619951e8f33178c3185dbf7543845dfxss[.]codesSkype.exe
01d1b63eace6383428e42c48f3d1e13e643e8a8f70d4af5d4ee6f47a0522e300xss[.]codesSkype.exe
0dda7e987104867695be561a8008d3282252e05c611c247eae62c7b798be0e24139.162.137[.]240/man.php3_Members_of_the_Committee_on_National_Defence_and_Foreign_Affairs.exe
13171d3b1acf5ffbae47777cae03d5d6cb96d2d9b76fe4491bf547b2e309fb52xss[.]codesSkype.exe
1de46a62f53dbf3b4668bfa7fe63c022c541d8651f776fa5fd8060f21036e63a213.252.246[.]79/Chrome.exe

213.252.246[.]79/main.php?s=
SkypeApp.exe
487bb8f6c0b6691d3575eee3faa8bfc73ddebe0d1052c02b636cc0a394ed384dupdate.qnetau[.]net/syw.php?

213.252.247[.]10
528fd0b183dd1ca2d109af1714d1ee89d3244c37451203b7b14e951742e16741cn.sslname[.]comSystem.exe
702108f50f953aff3c2b345c2604e9fa614cb86d8299c209065b41878fd4f66bxss[.]codesSkype.exe
71bbcd06a4a28f1f33a998928bfe6d78aa7a56fe068c61556f41e2586809a470xss[.]codes(potential test xlsm)
85ee62d57a17221e52325020b4d6f587f68fb321723be7ed794503b40bd989f7ns2[.]me/1p.phpSkype.exe
86b13a1058dd7f41742dfb192252ac9449724c5c0a675c031602bd9f36dd49b5X-Auth-43245-S-20[kauditd]
94e7fff8d4abccca0080004a497153ce04f74f7507b52ca092462e22d84f0f8ans2[.]me/ip.php?s=

213.252.247[.]10
SkypeApp.exe
aebc8acd17e247c8892e6a8226be4dbf2af3848bdcc1cc1536d1f8487bed55a4net3[.]me/man.php

“hello martin”
Skype.exe
b0307e523e5893f2a865b0abea91cb4fb2e9d86fc71e33adaf63c8878fac2748cn.sslname[.]comSkypeApp.exe
be4590c31e8385a67394f7d49147a0b97cff07da6ff771614d3d3ed9ad2cd49fns2[.]me/1p.php?s=Skype.exe
d7d699f04463e86abc85ec029953ea7d558fd385a5e73ce0cc0d9cd0dbebd41ecMd.eXE, “hello hgroup”
d7f53836227dde351def7c1a5e9dd03c3a49bdc4eec6342136795038aa6d415dope[.]ftp[.]sh

xss[.]codes
xlsm
ef1af0acb25dc88b223c7b6a6be48d35a64665bb372cf8b7674cacd5818f7ff3ns2[.]me/ip.php?s=Update.exe
f5e0edca8a63eb45054039104f509ef0e66fc2e67637614a0f386803506cbac1update.qnetau[.]net/syw.php?s=mpam-fe.exe
f8cb77919f411db6eaeea8f0c8394239ad38222fe15abc024362771f611c360fnet3[.]me/b/kdd

net3[.]me/b/socat
upxa.sh

Figure 1: Publicly available ST samples

Standalone string matches, after unpacking, remains an easy pivot to expand a dataset. Although these are not definitive pivot points, Sea Turtle does leverage a number of strange capitalizations and “shout-outs” to unknown persons, that can be combined to cast a net.

Initial phish

Figure 2: obligatory IDA of d7d699f04463e86abc85ec029953ea7d558fd385a5e73ce0cc0d9cd0dbebd41e

Initial phish

Figure 3: b0307e523e5893f2a865b0abea91cb4fb2e9d86fc71e33adaf63c8878fac2748

In our next pivot, we’ll examine Passive/Active DNS datasets, to try to find infrastructure “one hop” away.

Initial phish

Figure 4: PADNS coming to CARA in Q1 '24

old artifactpivot pointnewnotes
ai-connector.splendor[.]org161.35.32[.]185ai-connector.splendos[.]orgnote “splendor->splendos”
querryfiles[.]com93.115.22[.]212netssh[.]net
ai-connector.goldchekin[.]com168.100.10[.]187ono.technewsir[.]gqpossibly a “technews iran” spoof. however, like most pivoting these days, this is one hop away from a crypto cluster

Figure 5: PADNS pivots leads to more artifacts

Sea Turtle has been known to spoof news-related websites, and PWC highlighted three: alhurra[.]online, al-marsad[.]co, anfturkce[.]news. Examining their infra, some of the IPs or domains throw a 426 response seen below. A 426 error is “caused when a client is attempting to upgrade a connection to a newer version of a protocol, but the server is refusing to do so.” Despite this being a valid and common response code, when scanning the internet for that header/string, only ~25 results are returned with that exact context, and many appear to be interesting.

HTTP/1.1 426 Upgrade RequiredDate: Sat, 23 Dec 2023 22:09:37 GMTContent-Type: application/jsonContent-Length: 29Connection: keep-aliveServer: Apache
                  
                  {"detail":"Upgrade Required"}

Figure 6: Specific “426” server output from suspicious servers

Combining multiple artifacts such as the below can rule-in, or rule-out, indicators.

  • Low global prevalence
  • Timestamp overlaps, such as domain creation time or server ownership changes
  • Historical scan non-overlaps (when was the first time this string appeared anywhere)
  • Infrastructure similarly (registrars, hosting providers)
  • Legitimate content or lack thereof, especially on domains with highly legitimate keywords where you would expect a domain to be actually used

In the case of our specific “Upgrade Required” string with the same headers, SilentPush reports the first time they saw it was 2023-09-21, and Censys reports a similarly narrow set of IPs.

Initial phish

Figure 7: SSDEEP infrastructure scanning coming to CARA Q1 '24

old artifactpivot pointnew artifactnotes
Upgrade Required"192.153.57[.]31nuceciwan[.]news

solhaber[.]news

loading-website[.]net
“Nûçe Ciwan” is an oft-targeted Turkish news source

“Sol” is a Turkish newspaper. “haber” is Turkish for “news”
Upgrade Required"193.149.129[.]182solhaber[.]info“sol” is a Turkish newspaper
Upgrade Required"87.120.254[.]120caglayandergisi[.]net“Çağlayan Dergisi” is a Turkish blogger
Upgrade Required"93.123.12[.]151infohaber[.]net“haber” is Turkish for “news”
Upgrade Required"serverssl[.]net206.71.149[.]112146.70.157[.]28
Upgrade Required"168.100.9[.]203exp-al-marsad[.]co (PTR)not registered, although “Sl Marsad” is a human rights organization in the region
serverssl.net95.179.130[.]232mat-46.mehreganmobile[].ga

iran-azad[.]cyou
These domains were seen pointing to .232 only before the “upgrade behavior” started. Additional overlaps show lure domains with Iranian dissidents, such as Mahsa Aminiw, but will not be included in the high confidence indicator list
loading-website.net45.11.183[.]85

Figure 8: Additional discovered Turkish-themed domains

Another common pivot is to look at what SSL certs have lived on an IP address – in a specific timeframe – to understand what domains may have pointed there that your PADNS collection missed, or to find a campaign that is not fully live yet. An “indicator of (potential) future attack”. An example of this is alarabiyaa[.]online, where there is no record of a forward resolution, but we can see a cert with that domain on one of our “426” IPs, 206.166.251[.]163. The below table explores that technique.

Initial phish

Figure 9: SSL cert scanning coming to CARA Q1 '24

old artifactpivot pointnew artifactnotes
206.166.251[.]163426 + certwww.alarabiyaa[.]onlineA spoof of Al Arabiya, an Arabic language news organization
206.71.149[.]112426 + certwww.pictture[.]online426 is the only link, provided for posterity. However, it was created a week apart from the above domain, both leveraging the ‘online’ tld
45.61.139[.]232426 + certyoutu[.]vc426 is the only firm link, so provided for posterity. However both this and the ’tiktok’ leverage the obscure tld ‘.vc’.
64.190.113[.]216426 + certtiktok[.]vc426 is the only link, provided for posterity
206.188.196[.]228426 + certtechdateweb[.]com426 is the only link, provided for posterity
206.71.149[.]218426 + certlibia[.]cc426 is the only link, provided for posterity
192.153.57[.]78426 + certamezon[.]pro426 is the only link, provided for posterity

Figure 10: Additional potential infrastructure

It’s common for a domain to expire and point to an unrelated infra, but a well-formed certificate is an artifact that is generally intentionally created. For this reason, validity date ranges, along with domain creation timestamps, are useful data points when trying to timeline.

domaindomain creation timenot_beforenot_after
nuceciwan[.]news2022-11-26T11:23:562023-11-16 13:55:342024-02-14 13:55:33
solhaber[.]news2023-11-24T07:00:002023-11-24 07:57:352024-02-22 07:57:34
loading-website[.]net2023-01-19T07:00:002023-01-19 13:33:272023-04-19 13:33:26
solhaber[.]info2023-11-10T07:00:002023-11-14 07:47:072024-02-12 07:47:06
caglayandergisi[.]net2022-11-17T07:00:002023-08-24 12:52:022024-02-11 09:38:19
infohaber[.]net2023-03-24T07:35:382023-08-04 18:08:372023-11-02 18:08:36
alarabiyaa[.]online2023-11-13T21:52:212023-11-13 00:00:002024-02-11 23:59:59

Figure 11: Certificates for lookalike/spoof domains

At one point, the ‘426’ artifact was a curiosity, but we observed other commonalities. Many of the ‘426’ servers also contained a certificate for xtechsupport[.]org, and lived on infrastructure from a very small number of providers. Unlike the other domains discovered, ‘xtechsupport’ was registered through IHS, a Turkish domain registrar. There is no content publicly available about this domain.

IPProviderFirst matching scan for 426 response426 codextechsupport cert
168.100.10[.]119BLNWX, US2023-12-15yesyes
168.100.10[.]204BLNWX, USnoyes
168.100.10[.]80BLNWX, US2023-09-24yesyes
168.100.11[.]127BLNWX, US2023-11-02yesyes
168.100.8[.]103BLNWX, USnoyes
168.100.8[.]24BLNWX, US2023-10-11yesno
168.100.8[.]245BLNWX, US2023-12-01yesno
168.100.9[.]203BLNWX, US2023-10-26yesno
192.153.57[.]204BLNWX, USnoyes
192.153.57[.]31BLNWX, US2023-11-05yesyes
192.153.57[.]78BLNWX, US2023-11-19yesno
193.149.129[.]128BLNWX, USnoyes
193.149.129[.]182BLNWX, US2023-11-19yesno
193.149.189[.]94BLNWX, US2023-12-20yesno
195.85.114[.]106BLNWX, US2023-11-03yesno
206.166.251[.]161BLNWX, USyesno
206.166.251[.]163BLNWX, US2023-12-03yesno
206.188.196[.]132BLNWX, US2023-12-19yesyes
206.188.196[.]228BLNWX, US2023-10-17yesno
206.188.196[.]90BLNWX, USnoyes
206.71.149[.]112BLNWX, US2023-12-03yesno
206.71.149[.]218BLNWX, US2023-12-23yesno
31.13.195[.]52NETERRA-AS, BG2023-11-10yesno
45.61.139[.]232BLNWX, US2023-10-05yesno
64.190.113[.]216BLNWX, US2023-12-06yesno
87.120.254[.]120NETERRA-AS, BG2023-12-07yesno
93.123.12[.]151NETERRA-AS, BG2023-09-21yesno
95.179.130[.]232AS-CHOOPA, US2023-10-27yesno

Figure 12: Servers currently responding with the specific ‘426’ error

At the end of an analysis exercise, it’s useful to do one last sweep through the collated indicator list, to look for commonalities that may have been missed. In the below table, armed with a higher confidence of “xtechsupport”, we’ll pivot once more.

initial artifactpivotnew artifactnotes
xtechsupport[.]orgwhere else have we seen this cert, that was not on a previous indicator list?168.100.10[.]204

168.100.8[.]103

192.153.57[.]204

206.188.196[.]90

193.149.129[.]128
Potentially interesting domains an additional hop away, but many at the same provider. Without stronger links, these artifacts have a lower confidence

168.100.8[.]103

infoviewdr[.]click, accepteddr[.]click

168.100.10[.]204

test.allsocial[.]site

168.100.8[.]24

appmetadata[.]co
xtechsupport[.]org23be.xtechsupport[.]org45.61.137[.]131426 on 23be, but the domain only pointed to the IP on 12/14/23

Figure 13: Subsequent pivot from xtechsupport

For an easier to parse list of indicators, please visit our GitHub page.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the internal reviewers, as well as peer vendors, for their comments and corrections. Please get in touch if you have further corrections, or would like to collaborate on research in the future.

Additionally, we would like to thank Censys, Silent Push, and VirusTotal.

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Alex Lanstein

Chief Evangelist

Alex Lanstein is the Chief Evangelist at StrikeReady, running threat research and driving DFIR platform capabilities. Previously, Alex spent 15 years at FireEye, closing the loop between threat actor observations and product development.

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